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APPEALING REMAND ORDERS UNDER
THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT

David L. Horan*
Defendants generally may not appeal orders that remand
cases once removed to federal court.' For parties in cases filed
as class actions, however, Congress provided in February 2005 a
new avenue for appellate review through 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c), a
provision enacted in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.2
Section 1453(c) provides for discretionary appellate review of
any order den3ying or granting remand of a removed class action
to state court.

*David L. Horan is an associate with Jones Day in Dallas, Texas, where his focus is Issues
and Appeals. He graduated from Yale Law School and served as a law clerk for the
Honorable Janet C. Hall of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
and the Honorable Patrick E. Higginbotham of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. Mr. Horan and other Jones Day attorneys represented several defendants in
Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2005). The views expressed in this
article are solely the author's and are not intended to express the views of Jones Day or any
of its past, present, or future clients.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (available at http://uscode.house.gov); Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119
Stat. 4 (2005).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c).
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Though this discretionary appellate review offers some
relief to parties in class actions, appeals under § 1453(c) present
thorny procedural issues arising from imprecise and unclear
language in the CAFA, which mostly concerns whether a party
seeking to remove a class action to federal court must do so
based on § 1453 and when the application for appeal must be
filed. Thankfully, recent case law deciding the first round of
appeals filed under this new provision sheds light on the
procedural issues likely to confront litigants and courts of
appeals in the near future.
Admittedly, filing deadlines, briefing formats, and other
procedural requirements are not the stuff of most appellate
lawyers' dreams. But, these matters can keep lawyers up at
night, and getting them right is critical to presenting properly
any substantive arguments to any appellate court. With that
reality in mind, this article reviews the procedure-that is, the
"who, what, where, when, and how"-for bringing a § 1453(c)
appeal and concludes with several guidelines on navigating this
statutory appeals process.
THE WHAT

Congress limits review of many remand orders through 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d), which states that "[a]n order remanding a case
to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable
on appeal or otherwise." 4 In cases involving class actions,
however, the CAFA provides a statutory procedure for
reviewing such remand orders. Section 1453(a) provides that a
"class action" is defined as
any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial
procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more
representative persons.5

4. 28 U.S.C. §1447(d).
5. 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(1)(B) (available at http://uscode.house.gov); see 28 U.S.C. §
1453(a) (providing that "[i]n this section, the terms . . . 'class action' . . . shall have the
meanings given such terms under section 1332(d)(1)").
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Section 1453(b) provides for removal of a class action
regardless of whether a defendant is a citizen of the forum state
or whether all defendants consent to removal:
[a] class action may be removed to a district court of the
United States in accordance with section 1446 (except that
the 1-year limitation under section 1446(b) shall not apply),
without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the
State in which the action is brought, except that such action
may be removed by any defendant without the consent of
all defendants. 6
And, § 1453(c)(1) provides that an order concerning a motion to
remand a class action back to the state court from which the case
was removed is reviewable:
Section 1447 shall apply to any removal of a case under
this section, except that notwithstanding section 1447(d), a
court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a
district court granting or denying a motion to remand a
class action to the State court from which it was removed.7
This last provision, § 1453(c)(1), raises two important
interpretive issues as to the kinds of remand orders that are
subject to CAFA's discretionary appeals and, thus, are excluded
from the general prohibition on appellate review. First,
§ 1453(c)(1) may require parties seeking appellate review to
have called upon this section and to have relied on particular
jurisdictional statutes when the class action was removed to
federal court. And this section may authorize appeals from
orders remanding a removed class action sua sponte or as a
result of a show cause order and, in either case, not based upon a
party's motion to remand.
Section 1453(c)(1) authorizes discretionary appeals from an
order granting or denying remand of a class action only if the
case was removed pursuant to § 1453(b). 8 The Fifth Circuit in9
Wallace v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp.
accordingly held that it lacked § 1453(c)(1) appellate
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1); see 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (providing general removal
procedures).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
9. 444 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2006).
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jurisdiction to review a remand order, because the defendants
failed to base their notice of removal on the CAFA, and because
they "expressly disavowed any reliance on CAFA" when
opposing the plaintiffs' motion to remand, such that there was
"no nexus with CAFA that would justify the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction under § 1453(c)(1)."' From the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Wallace and the language of § 1453(c)(1)
itself, it is reasonable to conclude that any class action defendant
filing a notice of removal must invoke § 1453(b) as a basis for
removal to preserve the possibility of a remand appeal.
Another aspect of this procedural issue is whether a party
invoking § 1453(b) to remove a class action also must satisfy
class action diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
Section 1332(d)(2), which was enacted in the CAFA along with
§ 1453, generally grants federal district courts original
jurisdiction if the amount in controversy exceeds five million
dollars, and the dispute is a "class action" in which any member
of the plaintiffs class is a citizen of a state different from any
defendant. 12
While there is no doubt that § 1453(b) removal of a class
action can be based on §1332(d) class action diversity
jurisdiction, § 1453(b) does not limit removal of class actions
only to those that could be brought under a federal court's
§1332(d) class action diversity jurisdiction. Although some
courts have implied in dicta that removal under § 1453(b) is
limited to cases that meet the §1332(d) diversity requirements,
such a reading of § 1453(b)'s scope is not supported by its
text.' 3 There is no explicit limitation, because Congress did not
10. 444 F.3d at 700 (noting in addition that "[t]he plain language of [§ 1453(c)(1)]
indicates that its terms apply 'to any removal of a case under this section,' referring to §
1453, the provision of CAFA which permits the removal of class actions" (emphasis in
original)).
11. See generally Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 681-82 (9th Cir.
2006) (per curiam) (discussing the operation and scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) in
comparison to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and 28 U.S.C. §1446).
12. 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2).
13. See Adam N. Steinman, Sausage-Making, Pigs' Ears, and Congressional
Expansions of Federal Jurisdiction: Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah and its Lessons for the
Class Action FairnessAct, 81 Wash. L. Rev. 279, 332-34 (2006) (citing Pritchett v. Office
Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1092 (10th Cir. 2005) and Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp.
2d 161, 166-67 (D. Mass. 2005), aff'don other grounds, 424 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2005) (per
curiam)).
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explicitly limit § 1453(b)'s applicability, as it did in other CAFA
provisions. 14 And there is no implicit limitation, because
§ 1453(b) allows removal of a class action "in accordance with
section 1446,"' 15 which generally prescribes the removal
procedures for civil actions and criminal prosecutions and also
does not restrict its applicability to any particular federal
jurisdictional statute.' 6 Because § 1453(c)(1) relies on § 1453(b),
which plainly relies on §1446, § 1453(c)(1) authorizes appeals
from any order remanding or refusing to remand a class action
so long as it is removed pursuant to § 1453(b), regardless of the
basis for the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Some courts have rejected this view, however.' 7 The Eighth
Circuit has concluded that "the review provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1453(c) are limited to class actions brought under CAFA, 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d). ' ' 8 That court reasoned that, while
§ 1453(c)(1)'s appeal provision applies by its own terms "to any

removal of a case under this section," § 1453(a) defined "'class
action'

. . . by reference to § 1332(d)(1),

the diversity

jurisdiction provision added by CAFA."1 9 By this reasoning, the
court found that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the appeal
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(l)-(3) (providing that discretionary appellate review does
not apply to any class action solely involving a claim concerning a covered security as
defined under specific sections of securities acts, a claim relating to internal affairs or
governance of a business enterprise and arising under or by virtue of the laws of the State
in which such business enterprise is incorporated or organized, or a claim relating to the
rights, duties, and obligations relating to any security); see also Steinman, supra n. 12, at
294-98, 323 (noting that "the text of CAFA's removal provision... allow[s] removal of all
state court class actions except certain specifically exempted categories of securities and
corporate governance class actions").
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)-(b) (generally providing that defendants wanting to remove
shall file in the district court a notice of removal within thirty days of receiving the initial
pleading).
17. Saab v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 469 F.3d 758, 760 (8th Cir. 2006); cf Serrano v.
180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that "[a]lthough remand
orders generally are not appealable, . . . § 1453(c) confers discretionary appellate
jurisdiction to review remand orders in actions that were removed under CAFA" (emphasis
added)); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11 th Cir. 2006) (noting in a
parenthetical explanation of§ 1453(c) that, in relation to § 1453(c)(1), "notwithstanding 28
U.S.C. §1447(d), [a] court of appeals may review [a] remand order where case was
removed under CAFA" (emphasis added)).
18. Saab, 469 F.3d at 760.
19. Id. at 759.
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of an order denying remand based on §1332(a) traditional
diversity jurisdiction, because § 1453(c) applies only to class

actions removed based on § 1332(d) class action diversity
jurisdiction simply because Congress incorporated by reference
§ 1332(d)(1)'s definition of "class action." Limiting § 1453's
applicability through this reasoning seems tenuous at best,
because § 1332(d)(1)'s definition of "class action" could easily
apply to class actions that satisfy the requirements for, for
question
jurisdiction.
Nevertheless,
example,
federal
practitioners should note the Eighth Circuit's ruling.
A final and related aspect of the applicability of
§ 1453(c)(1) concerns whether a court of appeals is limited upon
review of the remand order. Here, the circuit courts are split.
The Seventh Circuit found in Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc.,20 that
[b]ecause § 1453(c)(1) permits appellate review of remand
orders "notwithstanding section 1447(d)", [a court of
appeals is] free to consider any potential error in the district
court's decision, not just 2a1 mistake in application of the

Class Action Fairness Act.
As Judge Easterbrook explained for the Seventh Circuit panel,
where an "appeal is proper because the district judge reject[s a
defendant's] argument that the Class Action Fairness Act allows
removal," and where § 1453(c)(1) thus "authorizes interlocutory
appellate review, it is the district court's entire decision that
comes before the court for review." 22 From this court's
rationale, potential class action parties can conclude that a court
of appeals can reverse a remand order on the basis of arguments
not limited to challenging mistakes in applying CAFA
provisions.
As Wallace suggests, the Fifth Circuit, however, has taken
a contrary view. Specifically in Patterson v. Dean Morris,
L.L.P., 23 the Fifth Circuit observed that
[t]hough CAFA also provides that we "may accept an
appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying
20.
21.
22.
23.

Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 451 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1)).
Id. at 451-52 (citing Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996)).
448 F.3d 736 (5th Cir. 2006) (Patterson11).
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a motion to remand a class action," this precatory language
cannot serve as a mandate for us to reach otherwise nononce we determine that
reviewable remand decisions
24
CAFA is inapplicable.

The court went on to hold that CAFA limits discretionary review
of a remand order "premised on the prerequisites of § 1453 or on
claims with an adequate nexus to CAFA."
The Eleventh Circuit for its part adopted the conclusion
implicit in the reasoning of both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.
In Tmesys, Inc. v. Eufaula Drugs, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit
found that it has jurisdiction to review a remand order "when
that order is based on a determination that CAFA does not
apply, at least to the extent of reexamining that jurisdictional
issue. 26 Thus, potential class action parties in cases within the
Eleventh Circuit can conclude that a court of appeals will
examine whether it has jurisdiction to review the remand order
and may or may not examine the order in its entirety, depending
on whether the court finds CAFA applicable to the case.
Another important interpretative issue as to the kinds of
remand orders that are subject to CAFA appeals concerns
whether § 1453(c)(1) authorizes appeals from orders remanding
a removed class action sua sponte or as a result of a show cause
order and, in either case, not based on a party's motion to
remand. By its plain terms, § 1453(c)(1) authorizes appeals of
district court orders "granting or denying a motion to remand a
class action." 27 While perhaps academically interesting, this
semantic issue should not block any appeals in practice, because
a court remanding a case sua sponte or based on a show cause
order is properly understood to be acting "on its own motion."
Thus, its order will fit within the letter of the statute.
Indeed, at least one court of appeals is apparently unmoved
by this possible issue. The Ninth Circuit in Abrego Abrego v.
Dow Chemical Co. 28 and Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc. 29 accepted
24. Id. at 742 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1)).
25. Id.
26. Tmesys, Inc. v. Eufaula Drugs, Inc., 462 F.3d 1317,
(emphasis in original).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (emphasis added).
28. 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006).
29. 377 F. Supp. 2d 807 (C.D. Cal. 2005).

1319 (11th Cir. 2006)
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§ 1453(c)(1) appeals from orders remanding putative class
3
actions based on the district courts' own orders to show cause. 0
THE WHO AND THE WHERE

The CAFA permits the filing of a discretionary appeal
either by a plaintiff whose motion for remand of a class action is
denied or by a defendant against whom an order remanding a
removed class action is entered. 3 1 The appeal must be filed in
the court of appeals for the circuit in which the district court
issuing the order sits. 32 That court has discretion to accept such
an appeal.33 Section 1453(c) neither requires nor permits any
involvement by the district court regarding the appeal.34
THE WHEN

Congress included in the CAFA a timing provision that
restricts when an appellant can file an application to appeal an
order granting or denying a motion to remand with the court of
appeals. Section 1453(c)(1) provides that this application may
be accepted if the "application is made to the court of appeals
not less than 7 days after entry of the order., 35 This timing
provision raises several tricky issues regarding the timing for
seeking such a discretionary § 1453(c) appeal.
First, the statute is clear that the period for filing an
"application" is triggered by the "entry" on the district court's

30. See Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 678 (noting that the district court ordered a party to
show cause concerning the amount in controversy); Bush, 377 F.Supp. 2d at 808 (noting
that the district court ordered the parties to "show cause why this action should not be
remanded to the state court for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction"), aff'd, 425 F.3d

683 (9th Cir. 2005).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1).
32. Id.
33. Id.;see also Patterson 11, 448 F.3d 736; Patterson v. Dean Morris, L.L.P.
(Patterson1), 444 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2006); Amalgamated Transit Union 1309 v. Laidlaw
Transit Servs, Inc., 435 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2006); Prime Care of N.E. Kan., LLC v.
Humana Ins. Co., 447 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2006); Pritchettv. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d
1090 (10th Cir. 2005); Evans.v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2006).
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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docket sheet of the36 order at issue, rather than the filing or
signing of the order.
The second timing issue concerns when a party to a class
action seeking review of a remand order must file his appeal.
One theory as to when to file simply relies on the plain text of §
1453(c)(1)'s timing provision and requires a party to a class
action seeking review of a remand order to file 37
his appeal seven
days after entry of the remand order, not before.
Courts confronted with the issue of application timeliness
have refused to find that Congress's folly is the courts' pain,
however, even though the plain language of the statute suggests
both that six days is too early to file a petition and that there is
no time limitation as to when an application must be filed. The
Tenth Circuit noted in Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc.38 that
according to the plain language of § 1453(c)(1), an "appeal from
an order granting or denying remand cannot be taken within
seven days of the order," and that "[o]nce that period passes....39
the statute would permit an appeal ... at any time thereafter."
Relying on the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee
accompanying the CAFA, however, the court reasoned that,
[g]iven Congress' stated intent to impose time limits on
appeals of class action remand orders and the limited
availability of appeals prior to the statute's enactment, we
can think of no plausible reason why the text of [the
CAFA] would instead impose a seven-day waiting period
followed by a limitless window for appeal.
The court in Pritchett found that § 1453(c)(1)'s timing provision
is the result of "a typographical error" and that "[t]he statute
should read that an appeal is permissible if filed
'not more than'
41
seven days after entry of the remand order.",

36. Id.; accord Patterson1, 444 F.3d at 368, 368 n. 1; Bush, 425 F.3d at 685; Pritchett,
420 F.3d at 1093; Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1326.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1).
38. 420 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005)
39. Pritchett,420 F.3d at 1093 n. 2 (emphasis in original).
40. Id., at 1093 n. 2; see Sen. Rpt. 109-14 (Feb. 28, 2005).
41. 420 F.3d at 1093 n. 2 (emphasis added) (quoting Sen. Rpt. 109-14, at 49: "parties

must file a notice of appeal within seven days after entry of a remand order").
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The Ninth Circuit when confronted in Amalgamated
Transit Union 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc.,42 with
§ 1453(c)(1)'s timing provision, expressed misgivings about
being "faced with the task of striking a word passed on by both
Houses of Congress and approved by the President, and
''3
replacing it with a word of the exact opposite meaning.
Although not without controversy, it did so anyway, to hold that
there is no apparent logical reason for the choice of the
word "less" in the statute, use of the word "less" is, in fact,
illogical and contrary to the stated purpose of the provision,
and the statute should therefore be read to require that an
application to appeal under § 1453(c)(1) must be filed-in
accordance with the requirements of [Rule 5 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure]-not
more than 7 days after
44
the district court's order.
The Fifth Circuit has also interpreted the timing Provision in the
same manner without any discussion or analysis. 5
Like these circuits, the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that
a § 1453(c)(1) appeal must be filed "within 7 days of the district
court's remand order."4 6 This court explained in Miedema v.
Maytag Corp. that to read the statute's language
literally would produce an absurd result: there would be a
front-end waiting period (an application filed [six] days
after entry of a remand order would be premature), but
there would be no back-end limit (an application filed 600
days after4 7 entry of a remand order would not be
untimely).

42. 435 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2006).
43. Union 1309, 435 F.3d at 1146.
44. Id (emphasis in original); accordAbrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 677 n. 1 (ruling that
a petition filed on the seventh day following entry of the remand order is timely); Serrano,
478 F.3d at 1020 n. 2 (indicating that a petition filed on the sixth court day after entry of
the remand order is timely).
45. See Patterson 1, 444 F.3d at 368 n. 1 (rejecting an argument that an application
filed nine calendar days after the entry of the order was untimely, because the application
was filed within seven court days after the order's entry and, therefore, was timely pursuant
to Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(2)).
46. Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1326 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (quoting Evans,
449 F.3d at 1162) (emphasis in original).
47. Id. at 1326.
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The Third Circuit reached the same conclusion in Morgan v.
Gay,48 citing Miedema with approval.49 In an unpublished
decision, the Seventh Circuit in Natale v. General Motors
Corp.50 likewise found that § 1453(c)(1) requires filing "within
seven days of the district court's remand order.",5' The panel
also found that a § 1453(c)(1) appeal is timely if filed within
seven days of an order denying a motion to reconsider a remand
order, relying on Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. 52 Accordingly, in the Third, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits, and likely in the Seventh Circuit, 53 a
§ 1453(c)(1) application must be filed on the seventh day or
sooner from the entry of the remand order, despite contrary
textual direction in the statute.
Guidance on the proper timing of a § 1453(c) application is
less easy to come by outside these circuits. The First and Eighth
Circuits have not expressly addressed this "drafting" issue but
have accepted appeals through applications filed on a widely
varying number of days after entry of the remand order. The
First Circuit has acted on an application filed seven calendar
days from the remand order's entry. 54 The Eighth Circuit has
acted on an application filed eight calendar days from the
remand order's entry 55 and an application filed eleven calendar
days from entry of the order denying remand.56
Thus, the experience in courts of appeals precludes a firm
conclusion on whether each court will interpret § 1453(c)(1)'s
48. Morgan v. Gay (Morgan I), 466 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2006).
49. 466 F.3d at 279.
50. 2006 WL 1458585 (7th Cir. May 8, 2006) (unpublished).
51. Id. at *1.
52. Id; see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).
53. Unpublished opinions such as Natale v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2006 WL 1458585, are
not considered precedent and generally have value only to the issuing court and the parties
involved.
54. See Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161 (docket sheet for 1:05-CV-10590
noting that the "application for leave to appeal" was filed with the court of appeals seven
days after entry of the remand order), affid, 424 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2005).
55. See Plubell v. Merck & Co., 434 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2006) (docket sheet for 058020 noting that the "petition for permission to appeal" was filed eight days after entry of
the remand order), aff'g 2005 WL 2739036 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 20, 2005) (unpublished).
56. See Saab v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2006 WL 1877077 (W.D. Mo. July 6, 2006)
(unpublished), petition dismissed by 469 F.3d 758 (docket sheet for 06-8014 noting that the
petition for permission to appeal was filed eleven days after entry of the remand order).
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timing provision to provide that an appeal is timely if the

application is filed (1) not less than seven days after the remand
order's entry, which follows a literal reading of § 1453(c)(1) and
requires filing on the eighth day or later; (2) not more than seven
days after the remand order's entry, which follows the Third,
Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits' holdings and requires
filing on the seventh day or earlier; or (3) less than seven days
after the remand order's entry, which follows at least the Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits' reasoning but not their precise
reading of the statute and requires filing on the sixth day or
earlier.
The third issue regarding § 1453(c)(1)'s timing provision
arises because the statute does not specify what type of day
Congress intended to apply: a calendar day or a court day. Rule
26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
provides that, where the filing "period is less than 11 days" and
is not "stated in calendar days," the time period excludes
"intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. 57 By
applying Rule 26(a)(2) to § 1453(c)(1), if the application must
be filed in "not more than seven days" from the order's entry,
the petitioner must file within seven court, not calendar, days.
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits squarely addressed this issue,
followed Rule 26(a)(2), and construed the statutory language to
mean court days, thereby excluding intermediate weekends and
holidays. 58 The Third and Eleventh Circuits likewise held that
§ 1453(c)(1)'s
time limit is measured in court, not calendar,
59
days.
No other circuit has expressly decided this issue, and the
experience in courts of appeals outside the Third, Fifth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits precludes a firm conclusion as to what
type of day Congress intended § 1453(c)(1) to refer. The timing
provisions of § 1453(c)(1) thus present thorny and unsettled
issues for petitioners in circuits that have not yet explicitly
interpreted the statute. Petitioners in these courts must guess
whether § 1453(c)(1) requires filing not less than seven calendar
or court days, not more than seven calendar or court days, or less
57. Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(2).
58. See Patterson1,444 F.3d at 368 n. 1; Union 1309, 435 F.3d at 1146.
59. See Morgan 1, 466 F.3d at 277 n. 1; Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1326.
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than seven calendar or court days after entry of the appealed
order.
Under these circumstances, the vigilant petitioner should
file within six calendar days to ensure that the application will
be timely under any possible reading of the statute. At worst,
filing on the sixth calendar day will be premature if a court of
appeals strictly interprets § 1453(c)(1) to prohibit filing less than
seven days after the order's entry. In that instance, the petitioner
would run no real risk if the application can be filed again after
the seventh court day has passed, because, as the Tenth Circuit
has noted, this reading of § 1453(c)(1) "would permit an
appeal... at any time thereafter., 60 The careful petitioner thus
will hedge against the risk of filing late and the risk of filing
prematurely. This strategy accounts for both the likelihood that
more courts of appeals will follow the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits' statutory interpretation that § 1453(c)(1)
requires filing in seven or less court days and also the possibility
that a court could instead interpret Congress to have intended
§ 1453(c)(1) to prohibit filing in less than seven calendar or
court days or to require filing in less than seven calendar days
after entry of the order.
THE How
Courts of appeals have not settled which federal rules of
appellate procedure govern § 1453 appeals: Rules 3 and 4 or
Rule 5. Rule 3 generally concerns an "appeal permitted by law
as a right from a district court to a court of appeals." 62 Rule 3(a)
requires an appellant to file a "notice of appeal with the district
clerk within the time allowed by Rule 4.,63 In general, under

60. Pritchett,420 F.3d at 1093 n. 2.
61. Cf.James M. Garner, The Class Action FairnessAct: Has the Party Just Begun?,

80 Tul. L. Rev. 1669, 1693 (2006) (suggesting than one file "both before and after seven
days from entry of the remand order, or ...on the seventh day after the district court orders
remand"); Gregory P. Joseph, Federal Class Action Jurisprudence after CAFA, Exxon

Mobil, and Grable, 8 Del. L. Rev. 157, 185 (2006) (recommending that one file on the
seventh day after the remand order's entry).
62. Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(1).
63. Id.

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

Rule 4, an appellant must file a notice of appeal within
64 "30 days
after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.
According to the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits, Rule 5 governs "the How" for filing
§ 1453(c) appeals.6 5 Rule 5 generally governs appeals from a
district court order by permission. Under Rule 5(a), the appellant
must file an application for permission to appeal, rather than a
notice of appeal, with the clerk of the court of appeals within the
time specified by § 1453. 6 6 Under Rule 5(b), a non-petitioning
party "may file an answer in opposition or a cross-petition
within 7 [court] days after the petition is served," and "[tihe
petition and answer will be submitted without oral argument
unless the court of appeals orders otherwise.' 67 If the application
for permission to appeal is granted, the petitioner must satisfy
the appeal, including
the requirements of Rule 5(d)(1) to perfect
68
paying the district clerk all required fees.
Although most circuits have not discussed directly whether
§ 1453(c)(1) appeals should proceed under Rules 3 and 4 or
under Rule 5, the First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have accepted
appeals filed as applications or petitions for leave or for
permission to appeal. 9 Because these courts have not concluded
which rules of appellate procedure govern § 1453(c)(1) appeals,
the careful practitioner will file both a notice of appeal,
64. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l)(A); but see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l)(B) (providing that if
either party is the U.S. or its officer or agency, the notice of appeal may be filed within 60
days of the order's or judgment's entry).
65. See DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of NY, 469 F.3d 271, 274 (2d Cir. 2006);
Patterson1, 444 F.3d at 368-69; Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc., 457 F.3d 675,
678-79 (7th Cir. 2006); Union 1309, 435 F.3d at 1142-45; Evans, 449 F.3d at 1162-63.
66. Fed. R. App. P. 5(a) (providing that a party must file a petition for permission to
appeal within time specified by the statute authorizing the appeal); see Fed. R. App. P.
5(b)-(c) (providing the required contents and form of the petition for permission to appeal);
accord Main Drug, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 475 F.3d 1228, 1232 (1 1th Cir.
2007) (detailing the required contents of a Rule 5 petition for permission to appeal).
67. Fed. R. App. P. 5(b)(2), (3).
68. Fed. R. App. P. 5(d)(1).
69. See Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 424 F.3d at 43 (noting that the court accepted the appeal
from the remand order pursuant to the CAFA.); Plubell, 434 F.3d at 1071 (concluding that
the court has jurisdiction under § 1453(c)(1) to consider the appeal of the remand order);
Pritchett, 420 F.3d at 1093-94 (concluding that the court accepts the appeal from the
remand order to consider whether it has jurisdiction to consider its jurisdiction to grant the
relief requested).
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complying with Rules 3 and 4, and a petition for permission to
appeal, complying with Rule 5.70
The limited decisions on § 1453(c) appeals only offer some
guidance for drafting the required application. The application
should address both why the appeal should be allowed and why
the petitioner should prevail on the merits. 7 ' The petitioner
should draft the application assuming that the court of appeals
will decide the appeal entirely on the basis of the application and
the answer thereto, without further briefing. Petitioners in the
Seventh Circuit, in particular, should heed this advice, because
that circuit has already decided several § 1453(c) appeals on the
basis of only the application, 72answer, and, in a few cases, a reply
in support of the application.
THE WHAT THEN

After a petitioner files an application with the court of
appeals, Congress set forth in the CAFA a timeframe within
which the court must render its decision. Section 1453's
language unfortunately is unclear as to when this timeframe
begins: the date the application is filed or the date the
application is accepted.7 Section 1453(c)(2) does not specify
which date starts the clock running and instead only provides
that

70. See Gamer, supra n. 61, at 1693.
71. Fed. R. App. P. 5(b).
72. See Phillips,435 F.3d 785; Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (Knudsen 11), 435 F.3d
755 (7th Cir. 2005); Brill, 427 F.3d 446; Schillinger v. Union Pacific R.R., 425 F.3d 330
(7th Cir. 2005); Schorsch v. Hewlett-PackardCo., 417 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2005); Pfizer,
Inc. v. Lott, 417 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2005); Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (Knudsen I),
411 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2005); accord Patterson1, 444 F.3d at 369 n. 5 (noting that "[t]he
Seventh Circuit apparently either often or always considers the petition for permission to
appeal and the merits of the appeal simultaneously").
73. The timing issue of when the clock starts could be resolved easily if a § 1453(c)
appeal must be filed by means of a Rule 3 "notice of appeal," because the initial sixty-day
clock would run from the date on which the notice of appeal was filed. But see Union 1309,
435 F.3d at 1145 (concluding that a party seeking to appeal under § 1453(c)(1) must
comply with the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 5 and need not file a notice of appeal,
because "Congress chose in the language of the statute to require the filing of an
,application,' . . . not a 'notice of appeal,' and further required that the application be
'made to the court of appeals,' . , . whereas a notice of appeal is filed in the district court").
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[i]f the court of appeals accepts an appeal under [§
1453(c)(1)], the court shall complete all action on such
appeal, including rendering judgment, not later than 60
days after the date on which such appeal was
74 filed, unless
an extension is granted under [§ 1453(c)(3)].
The CAFA grants a court of appeals the discretion to extend its
timeframe within which to render its judgment.75 And the CAFA
provides that an appeal may be deemed denied if the court fails
to render a "final judgment"
before time expires under §
76
1453(c)(2) and (c)(3).
At first glance, by applying Rule 5(a) to the pertinent CAFA
provisions, the appeal could be deemed "filed" on the day the
party files its application or petition for permission to appeal.77
Following this theory, a court must complete all action on a
CAFA appeal within sixty days, or within the extended
timeframe granted under § 1453(c)(3), from the date on which
the petition was filed, or the appeal is deemed denied.78
The theory that the clock begins on the date the petition is
filed conflicts, however, with the plain language of Rule 5(d)(2),
which provides that that "[t]he date when the order granting
permission to appeal is entered serves as the date of the notice of
appeal for calculating time under these rules." 79 By applying
Rule 5(d)(2) to the relevant CAFA provisions, the court must
render its judgment within sixty days of accepting the
application, or within the time agreed upon under a § 1453(c)(3)
extension, or the appeal is deemed denied. This reading is more
practical than the first theory and has been adopted by the

74. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(2).

75. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(3).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(4) (providing that "[i]f a final judgment on the appeal under [§
1453(c)(1)] is not issued before the end of the period described in [§ 1453(c)(2)], including
any extension under [§ 1453(c)(3)], the appeal shall be denied").
77. Fed. R. App. P. 5(a) (providing that a party must file a petition for permission to
appeal within the time specified by the statute authorizing the appeal).
78. See Patterson 1, 444 F.3d at 369 (noting that "[i]f the period begins with the filing
of the motion for permission to appeal, a court of appeals might choose just to 'sit' on the
motion without ever ruling, content in the knowledge that after sixty days, the appeal will
disappear by operation of law, and the court will never have to consider the merits.").
79. Fed. R. App. P. 5(d)(2).
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Second, 80Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits.
The second reading of when the clock begins under §
1453(c)(2) also provides the more sensible and practical
interpretation of an already stringent requirement. 8' If a court of'
appeals seeks additional briefing beyond the application and
answer thereto, as the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have, the
court will face a Herculean challenge to complete briefing, oral
argument, and a decision on the merits within sixty days of the
filing of the application. 82 The challenge is exacerbated, because
the court of appeals seemingly cannot simply issue an order
reversing or affirming the remand order within the sixty-day
period with a more complete decision to follow later, because §
1453(c)(2) specifically mandates that the court of appeals "shall
complete all action on such appeal, including rendering
judgment," within the prescribed period. 83 If the court of appeals
fails to8do
so, the application will be deemed denied as a matter
4
of law.

This Herculean challenge may be eased through the use of
§ 1453(c)(3)'s time extension. Section 1453(c)(3) provides that
the
court of appeals may grant an extension of the 60-day
period described in [§ 1453(c)] (2) if-(A) all parties to the
proceeding agree to such extension, for any period of time;
80. See DiTolla, 469 F.3d at 273-75; Morgan v. Gay (Morgan 11), 471 F.3d 469, 47172 (3d Cir. 2006); Patterson1, 444 F.3d at 368, 369 n. 5, 370; Hart,457 F.3d at 679; Bush,
425 F.3d at 685-86, 686 n. 2; Pritchett,420 F.3d at 1093; Evans, 449 F.3d at 1162.
81. See Patterson1, 444 F.3d at 369.
82. Id.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(2) (emphasis added); accord Bush, 425 F.3d at 685-86, 686
n. 2; but see Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 54 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that
"[b]ecause appeals from an order denying a motion to remand under CAFA must be
decided 'not later than 60 days after the date on which such appeal was filed,' 28 U.S.C.
§ 1453(c)(2), ... we vacated the district court's denial by summary order and remanded the
case to that court"); Galeno v. Blockbuster, Inc., 171 Fed. Appx. 904, 904 (2d Cir. 2006)
(This court issued a "judgment" within seventy days after a ten-day extension granted nunc
pro tunc with the caveat that "[a] detailed opinion of the court will follow."); cf. Joseph,
supra n. 61, at 185 (noting that "the statute does not require an opinion from the court of
appeals, only a final judgment").
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(4); cf Patterson I, 444 F.3d at 371 n. I (Garza, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[w]henever the sixty-day period begins, the appellate court can choose to drag
its feet and allow the period to lapse").
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or (B) such extension is for good cause shown and in
85 the
interests of justice, for a period not to exceed 10 days.
However, this section raises a few interesting questions itself.
First, the statute provides no clue as to what constitutes "good
cause" for an extension. Second, § 1453(c)(3) may not permit a
court of appeals to grant itself sua sponte a ten-day extension "in
the interests of justice" because a court can grant such an
extension only "for good cause shown." The possibility of an
extension granted sua sponte raises the troublesome questions of
to whom and by whom good cause could be shown if the court
is acting on its own motion. The Ninth Circuit offers some
guidance in interpreting § 1453(c)(3) and provides that the court
of appeals
may grant an extension of the 60-day period where (1) all
parties to the proceeding agree to an extension and a given
period for the extension, or (2) the extension
is for good
86
cause shown and in the interests ofjustice.
That court noted that the extension granted "for good cause
shown87 and in the interests of justice" should be limited to ten
days.
A court may nevertheless avoid this issue where necessary
by either seeking the parties' input on a possible extension, as
the Ninth Circuit has, or by granting itself a ten-day extension
where it is convinced that the extension is necessary "in the
interests of justice" and for "good cause" that could be shown to
whomever may care to look. 88 The Fifth Circuit has in fact
expressly stated that, after accepting a CAFA appeal, it "retains
the statutory authority... sua sponte to extend, for good cause
shown, the date for rendering judgment. ' '89 Thus, the careful
practitioner should continue to monitor the case in the court of
appeals after filing an application to appeal and, if necessary,
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(3).
86. Bush, 425 F.3d at 686 n. 2.
87. Id.; accordLowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn., 479 F.3d 994, 996-97 (9th Cir.
2007).
88. Bush, 425 F.3d at 686.
89. Patterson1, 444 F.3d at 370; cf Galeno v. Blockbuster. Inc., 171 Fed. Appx. at 904
(suggesting that a court could "extend the deadline for decision by ten days, nunc pro tunc"
in order to "issue our judgment within the applicable time period" after the court grants
permission for leave to appeal).
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file a motion invoking § 1453(c)(3) to extend the court's time to
render a final decision and avoid the risk of having the
application be deemed denied because the court failed to act.
28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) APPELLATE PROCEDURE

[N A NUTSHELL

As discussed above, several interpretative issues linger for
parties seeking to appeal a class action remand order under §
1453(c). In the face of this procedural uncertainty in most
circuits, the best practical advice for parties seeking to "appeal
from an order of a district court granting or denying a motion to
remand a class action to the State court from which it was
removed" can be summarized as follows, unless the relevant
court of appeals has expressly held otherwise:
" File in the court of appeals for the circuit in which
the district court sits an application that complies
with the requirements of Rule 5 of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure as well as a notice of appeal
that complies with the requirements of Rules 3 and 4
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure;
" File the application and notice not more than six
calendar days after the entry of the order granting or
denying remand and, if necessary, file again after the
seventh court day after the entry of the order granting
or denying remand;
*

Draft the application to address both why the appeal
should be allowed and why the petitioner should
prevail on the merits, assuming that further briefing
before the court of appeals will not be permitted; and

" Seek an extension, preferably by agreement with the
other side, if necessary to permit the court of appeals
to complete any necessary action on the appeal and
to avoid the appeal being rejected as a matter of law.
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Following these guidelines does not guarantee success, of
course, but it would appear to give the appeal its best chance of
being heard and favorably decided.

